The Aegean Sea environment with the numerous and variable size islands along with the distances between themselves and between them and Greek mainland, forms a peculiar battlefield in which the attacker must firstly have air superiority in order to defeat the enemy’s island defense and protect its own sea transport means and destroy the enemy’s naval vessels, that will try to interrupt the equivalent friendly ones. Along with the sea transports it is also necessary to rapidly develop armed forces by air transport means in order to form bridgeheads, disorganize the enemy’s defense and assist the attacking forces from sea. Finally, the geological form of the islands is non-uniform with small beaches, rock edges and other non-uniform gulfs, while the inland is mainly mountain formed, with rocky and waterlessly heights, with the exception of some small areas that are forest covered. All the above indicate that along with the defender’s available time to organize his defense there is a need for attacking forces with excessive power. Furthermore the limited space does not allow many maneuvers but imposes violent frontal attacks, requiring armed forces with excellent physical shape, special training, discipline, and of the finest fighting spirit. These are the elements that differentiate them from the average armed forces and characterize them as Elite Forces.
The first sample of this type of battle can be found in the Battle of Crete, in May 1941 during the German Operation “Mercury” (Merkur). The Germans, having granted the absolute air superiority, launched their attack against the island with the 7th Parachute Division as the first wave, performing excessive paratroopers’ drops, overcoming the lack of sufficient naval means for a large scale landing operation. The target was to surprise the enemy and build strong bridgeheads to support the second wave of reinforcements of the 5th Mountain Division coming from the sea. The holdback of the convoys with the loss of quite a few vessels by the British Fleet, changed totally the plan of transferring forces to Crete. The mountain troops without previous air transport experience where lifted in Crete and after hard marches through mountain terrain, managed to overcome the enemy and win the battle along with the paratroopers. Under these circumstances, the Battle of Crete would never end successfully for the German side if the above mentioned Elite Forces were not used, with the special trained personnel, having the ability to adopt fast in the odd battle conditions. This characteristic is met in the Elite Forces all around the world.
In 1943, the operations in Dodecanise forced the Germans to face the same problems as in Crete two years earlier. This time instead of a single island it was a series of islands occupied by the British, who in co-operation with the Italians and the support of the dominating British Fleet were trying to control this cluster of islands. The achievement of local air superiority for conducting operations over islands, was necessary and was finally achieved despite the fact that the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) was already in declining power course. Despite the preparation of the invasion with bombings and the air cover of the invading naval forces to the Dodecanise islands that for one more time had to be conducted with exceptionally limited naval resources, the German Air Force would undertake the transport of Elite Forces performing drops of paratroopers, or airborne operations. At the same time commando and amphibious commando forces would act in separate or joint operations.
The first paratroopers drop took place on October 3rd 1943, in the framework of Operation “White Bear” (Eisbar) during the attack against Kos island. The 15th Parachute Company of the Special Forces Division “Bradenbourg” was dropped near the airport of Antimachia and in co-operation with the sea landed in Kefalos Bay 1st Amphibious Commando Company (Kustenjager) of the same division, managed to control the airport and the southwest part of the island. This operation along with other successful operations of General Miller’s Battle Group that had undertaken the Dodecanise operations, allowed the seizure of Kos island in 24 hours, depriving from the British-Italian forces in the area the last available airport, writing the fate of Leros and Samos islands that were left without air cover.
The next mission was carried out by the 1st Amphibious Commando Company “Bradenbourger” and ended with the bloodless seizure of Kalymnos island on October the 7th. This island was necessary for launching the attack against Leros island. On October 18th a detachment from 15th Parachute Company “Bradenbourger” left Faliro in hydroplanes and seized Levitha island, west of Leros island, neutralizing an Italian radio station, and at the same time releasing 50 German prisoners, that had wrecked a few days earlier. So by depriving Leros island from a vanward observation post, it was tighten from West also. Four days later, on October 22nd a new air drop of the 15th Parachute Company “Bradenbourger” this time in Astipalea island, in coordination with the transport in hydroplanes and the landing of one Commando company of the same division, allowed the fast seizure of the island, resulting in capturing of the Italian garrison and a team of the British LRDG. At the same operation 50 more German prisoners were released, shipwreckers too, while one more enemy base was removed, providing in this way more safety for the convoys transporting troops and material in Kos and Kalymnos islands, for the launching of the attack against Leros island.
For this operation that received the code name “Typhoon” (Taifun), new units of Elite Forces were placed under General Miller. The 1st Battalion, of the 2nd Regiment, of the 2nd Parachute Division, came from Italy to Athens, while the 3rd Battalion, of the 1st Commando Regiment, of the Special Forces Division “Bradenbourg”, that by this time was involved in anti-guerilla operations in Central Greece, acted as reinforcements.
Leros island, despite its small size (53 km2), has an extended shoreline (71 km) due to its manifold coastline. Three major bays, that of Lakki, Gourna, and Alinta separate the island in three parts. There are barely lowland parts of soil since the island is mainly mountainous with Skoumparda point (327m) the highest on it and slightly lower heights in the central and northern section. Lakki Bay had already been modified by the Italians from the mid ‘20s in a naval base and hydroplane station. For the efficient defense of the island they established radially 26 coastal and antiaircraft batteries with guns ranging from 76 to 152 mm of caliber, in order to repel enemy attack from any direction it may come. The Italian garrison consisted of 5,000 men and was reinforced by the British 234th Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier Tinley, and 3 more battalions, stationed each one in the northern, central and southern section of the island. The German plan against Leros island anticipated the conduct of landing operations north of Alinta Bay with 3 infantry battalions, with the amphibious commando company south of it and finally with one infantry battalion in the Gourna Bay. The mission assigned to the parachute battalion, that was to be dropped in the narrowest point of Leros island in the area of Rahi height, between Gourna and Alinta, was of decisive importance, since it would result in the cutoff of the island. After the seizure of the northern section of Leros, the seizure of the southern section would follow.
The attack that took place with the first light on November 12th, had in part satisfactory results. Bridgeheads were established north and south of Alinta Bay, but the landing operation in the Gourna Bay failed since the German landing crafts received dense fire from the Italian batteries and were forced to return in Kalymnos island. This failure was of great importance since the battalion that was about to land there had the task to secure the Drop Zone for the paratroopers. Despite that the drop was necessary for the smooth development of the operation and took place in the noon of the same day. The enemy was totally surprised since the paratroopers battalion landed over the slopes of Rahi height, an entirely improper Landing Zone according to the regulations that call for flat soil for the drops. In spite of some excessive reports for casualties found in some coalition literature, the paratroopers suffered minor casualties and the battalion soon after its landing regrouped, placing two of its companies covering the northwestern approaches and securing contact from northeast with the units landed in the north part of Alinta Bay, while the remaining two companies expanded the bridgehead in Rahi, pressing to the Merovigli height where the headquarters of the British command had been established. Since the Drop Zone was guarded by light groups only, the north part of Leros was cut off from the rest of the island after this unorthodox action of the German paratroopers.
The landing of the 1st Amphibious Commando Company of Special Forces Division “Bradenbourg”, that took place on the foothill of Pitiki height, south of Alinta Bay, was successful also. The company approached in assault crafts in a point untouched from the Italian batteries and landed in the rocky coast of Aspri Pounta. From there, the commandos hiked rapidly on the rough slope and hit on the top of the hill, the heavy Italian “Laggo” battery, capturing two out of the four guns. Despite the joint british-italian counterattacks that followed, the commandos remained firm in their positions and not only that but after receiving small reinforcements they completed the seizure of Pitiki the following day. After that, they started threatening the adjacent height of Knights Castle, trying to control the whole south end of Alinta Bay, to come in contact with the German bridgeheads in the central and northern section of Leros island and finally to participate in the seizure of Platanos, the capital of the island and Panteli, pressing Merovigli from the East.
On November 13th, the 15th Parachute Company “Bradenbourger”, dropped as reinforcements at Rahi for one more time despite the strong wind that made difficult the landing in this part of rough soil. Even though there was a serious number of casualties due to the rough soil, this unit head immediately to the first line. The successive counterattacks of the British in this sector, did not managed to drive back the paratroopers, that were fighting without heavy weapons, as all other German units, due to the heavy sea, but mainly because of the patrolling British ships, that made their transport impossible. This lack of heavy weapons was counterbalanced by the continuing presence of Luftwaffe over the battlefield, assuming the “flying artillery” role. On November 14th, third day of the battle, Brigadier Tinley tried to recapture Pitiki, but the attack was repulsed by the amphibious commandos. He also attempted to attack against the paratroopers stationed in Rahi in order to overwhelm them and after that without feeling any particular press by them to renew his attack against Pitiki.
This counterattack failed also, since the paratroopers held the British, so that Merovigli continued to be under threat from the North and East. The same stability in combat was displayed by part of all German units, overcoming the crisis situation that appeared to threaten the whole operation that day. The following day, November 15th the amphibious commandos and the units that reinforced them seized the Knight’s Castle, succeeding in unifying all German bridgeheads. The same day the 3rd Commando Battalion from Special Forces Division “Bradenbourg” that remained in Athens as reinforcement, arrived from Pireus via Kalymnos island. The battalion seized Panteli and as a result after the seizure of Agia Marina and Platanos that took place at the same time, Merovigli was pressed more from the North and East, in view of the final German attack scheduled for the following day.
The German attack and the gradual push to Merovigli launched in the morning of November 16th. The role of German Elite Forces was displayed superbly that afternoon, when Lieutenant Wantrei with his Commando platoon penetrated to the Tinley’s underground headquarters, on the top of Merovigli and forced him to surrender and consequently to cease the battle.
During the operation, the total forces participating in the battle by the German side, were four infantry battalions, one parachute battalion, one independent parachute company, one commando battalion and one amphibious commando company. The initial impression of numerical superiority of the conventional troops in comparison with the number of the Elite Forces is overruled if we take in consideration that only one infantry battalion had a force of more than 400 men, while the remaining three were actually of a 2 companies strength. After that it is clear the great emphasis that the German leadership gave in the participation of Elite and Special Forces in the operation, while they constituted only half of the involved troops.
After that it is unavoidable to remind the similar British Operation “Corporate” that took place almost forty years later, in 1982, for the recapturing of the Falklands islands from the Argentinians. In this case, the operation that was conducted almost exclusively by British paratroopers and marines forces with contribution of units of the Special Operation Forces, resulted in victory, establishing against the conventional military thought of the Argentinians, one commando perception that must be prevailed for the assumption of operations of that kind.
In 1943, the German side was that who acted according to that spirit. The landing operations in rocky shores and the paratrooper’s drops in height’s slopes, constitute exemplar of surprising actions that tie down and finally disorganize the defendant, rewarding a tactical way of thinking in great harmony with the indiosynchrasis of the Archipelagus.
In the case of Leros island this tactical way of thinking reached its climax, and from that period on, has been set as a model of fighting in this potential theater of operations.
Biographical Data
Manos Mastorakos born in Athens in 1960, is of Lakonian descent. He graduated the Ionidian Exemplar School of Pireus. He graduated from the Political Science & Public Administration Department of Law School of Athens University. He served his military service as a reserve Second Lieutenant in Signal Corp of Commando Forces where he earned his paratrooper wings. He was elected over a period of years as a member of Boarding Committee of Commando & Sacred Squadron Association and he is an official member of Athens Commando’s Association. He is a free lance contributor with “Strategy” and “War and History” magazines and he is the writer of the book “German Paratroopers 1939-1945”. He has a daughter.
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